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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the challenges in the study of corporate social responsibility
(CSR) is the balance between finding a "universalist" conception of
CSR, while acknowledging that each corporation's social responsibility
issues may be different. Carroll's' and Wood's 2 seminal works, for
* Senior Lecturer, University College London. This Article was presented at the 5th
Global Responsibility Conference in Lisbon, Sept. 23-25, 2010. The author is grateful to
Professor Charlotte Villiers for her comments on an earlier draft. All errors and omissions are
mine.
1. See Archie B. Carroll, A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate
Performance, 4 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 497 (1979); further refined in Archie B. Carroll, The
Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational
Stakeholders, 34 Bus. HORIZONs 39-48 (1991).
2. Donna J. Wood, Corporate Social Performance Revisited, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
691,693 (1991).
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example, attempt to capture comprehensive and "universalist" ideas of
CSR and performance. However, Windsor argues that how CSR is
understood and perceived still depends very much upon the business
context and the managerial dispositions of each corporation.3 This
Article focuses on CSR reporting. The developments in CSR reporting
highlight a crucial point we have reached in the discourse between the
"universalist" and "individualized" conceptions of CSR. The dominance
of standardization in reporting represents not only the convergence in
the language and transparency of CSR, but the convergence of CSR into
an agreed concept and a credible form of self-regulatory governance in
the issues that are unregulated.
CSR reporting is often seen as the reporting of the "triple bottom
line," recognizing environmental, social, and financial performance of
companies as being equally important. 4 Further, CSR reporting has also
moved from dominantly environmental reporting to more general
sustainability reports encompassing various areas of social interest such
as community and social impact, and human capital reporting.' Three
key developments witnessed over the last five years include:
The development of autonomous or stand-alone CSR reports;
The acceptance and adoption of standardised reporting
guidelines, in particular, those developed by the Global Reporting
Initiative ("GRI"), and the growth of CSR ratings; and
The development of the assurance industry for CSR reports.
Mandatory corporate reporting has always been a mainstay of
corporate accountability, but such accountability is usually seen as
owed to capital providers in mitigation of the agency problem. Such
mandatory reporting is largely financial reporting, although in the
1990s, the United States started to recognize the importance of non-

3. See Duane Windsor, The Future of Corporate Social Responsibility, 9 INT'L J.
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 225 (2001).
4. John Elkington, Enter the Triple Bottom Line, in THE TRIPLE BoTroM LINE, DOES IT
ALL ADD Up?: ASSESSING THE SUSTAINABILITY OF BUSINESS AND THE CSR 1, 1-16 (Adrian
Henriques & Julie Richardson eds., Earthscan 2004).
5. See CHARLOTTE VILLIERS, CORPORATE REPORTING AND COMPANY LAW (Barry Rider
ed., Cambridge U. Press 2006).
6. The author derives these observations from existing literature such as Villiers, ID and
KPMG INTERNATIONAL, KPMG INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
REPORTING 2008 13 (2008), available at http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndlnsights/
ArticlesPublications/PressReleases/Documents/CorporateSustainabilityReportUSFinal.pdf
[hereinafter KPMG INTERNATIONAL].

7. Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosureas a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1047, 1048 (1995).
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financial narrative disclosure,8 and in 2006, the United Kingdom, in
promulgating the UK Companies Act, also incorporated non-financial
narrative disclosure as part of the mandatory corporate reporting
regime.9 The UK Companies Act 2006 takes the approach of
incorporating stakeholder issues into the non-financial narrative report
as well.' 0
As such, the United Kingdom has gone forward to recognize some
form of stakeholder-oriented reporting, but not necessarily CSR
reporting, as part of its narrative non-financial reporting regime." In
2006, I argued that this is not a satisfactory position, as superficial
references to stakeholder impacts in annual business reviews do not
amount to CSR reporting, which is intended to present the corporation's
management with issues of social benefit and cost.12 CSR reports need
to be distinct from non-financial narrative reporting.' 3
I argued that non-financial narrative reporting is concerned
ultimately with shareholder demand in evaluating the financial
performance of companies, particularly in the short term.14 Hence, the
grafting of minimal stakeholder reporting onto this scheme does not
meet the needs of stakeholder interests and accountability.' 5 The
motivations driving CSR reporting tend to be a mixture' 6 of rational and
strategic reasons '7 as well as socially conscious values and even moral

8. 17 C.F.R. § 228.303 (2001).
9. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 417 (U.K.).
10. Id.
11. This goes beyond the EU Transparency Directive that requires half yearly
management reports to be filed by quoted companies in Europe, but such management reports
contain matters similar to the US MD&A, and do not explicitly mention stakeholder concerns.
Id.
12. See Iris H-Y Chiu, The Paradigms of Mandatory Non-Financial Disclosure: A
Conceptual Analysis (pts. 1 & 2), 27 COMPANY LAWYER 259 (2006).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Id.; see also Ruth Aguilera et al., Putting the S Back in Corporate Social
Responsibility: A Multilevel Theory of Social Change in Organizations,32 AcAD. MGMT. REV.
836 (2007).
16. Well discussed in John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and
Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J.
CORP. L. 1 (2005).
17. Li-Wen Lin, CorporateSocial and EnvironmentalDisclosure in EmergingSecurities
Markets, 35 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1 (2009) (dealing with the strategic reason of
becoming attractive to investors, particularly for companies in emerging economies); Lori
Holder-Webb et al., The Supply of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures Among U.S.
(2009) (mentioning image portrayal and reputational
Firms, 84 J. Bus. ETucS 497
management); Donald S. Siegel & Donald F. Vitaliano, An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Strategic
Use of Corporate Social Responsibility (2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-900521
(arguing that CSR reporting is ultimately part of strategic management of the business).
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or ethical dimensions.' As a result, the CSR report would deserve its
autonomy to be a platform of observability for proper CSR issues.
By 2009 however, the KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility
Reporting indicates that 80% of the CSR reports provided by the largest
250 global companies are standalone and distinct, no longer enmeshed
with non-financial narrative reporting." This also appears to be the
practice of the most significant UK companies such as BP,
GlaxoSmithKline, and others.20 In France and Denmark, mandatory
regulation that requires separate reporting of certain social
responsibility matters in environmental and social impact has helped to
enhance the status of the standalone CSR report. 2 1 However, the trend
of producing the CSR report as a distinct species of corporate disclosure
has also developed in countries such as the United States, where CSR
reporting is voluntary, 22 and in the United Kingdom, where CSR
reporting has exceeded the legal threshold of being part of directors'
annual business review, which is predominantly a non-financial
narrative report of the company's performance.2 3
It is not disputed that CSR reporting is on the rise and is increasingly
being treated as a separate species of reporting. However, as CSR
reports are narrative in nature, and not susceptible to being evaluated
upon objective standards such as accounting standards, they are often
criticized to be incomparable, vague, and subjective. The three key
trends of convergence and standardization in reporting, the rise in
providers of CSR ratings, and the industry for assurance have become
important to support the stature and credibility of the CSR report.
18. Conley & Williams, supra note 16, at 1; see also Lin, supra note 17 (discussing the
strategic reason of becoming attractive to investors, particularly for companies in emerging
economies); see also Holder-Webb et al., supra note 17 (discussing image portrayal and
reputational management); see also Siegel & Vitaliano, supra note 17 (arguing that CSR
reporting is ultimately part of strategic management of the business).
19. KPMG INTERNATIONAL,
KPMG INTERNATIONAL
SURVEY OF CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2008, at 13 (2008), available at http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/

IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/PressReleases/Documents/Corporate SustainabilityRe
portUSFinal.pdf.
20. E.g., BP Sustainability Review 2009, at http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.
do?categoryld=9032632&contentld=7060200; GlaxoSmithKline, New Corporate Responsibility
Report 2009, at http://www.gsk.com/responsibility/index.htm.
21. See Oliver Delbard, CSR Legislation in France and the European Regulatory
Paradox:An Analysis of EU CSR Policy and SustainabilityReporting Practice,8 CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 397 (2008). In Denmark, the requirement imposed on large businesses to report
CSR policies and impact as part of annual financial statements is found in the Danish Act No.
1403 of December 27, 2008. CorporateSocial Responsibility and Reporting in Denmark, http://
www.csrgov.dk/graphics/publikationer/CSR/CSRandReporting inDenmark.pdf (discussing
the effects of the legislation).
22. See Holder-Webb et al., supra note 17, at 497.
23. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 417 (U.K.).
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In particular, credibility in CSR reporting may underline the
voluntary best-practice nature of CSR as a credible, transparent
commitment capable of comparable evaluation, thus meeting a number
of objectives. One objective is to provide evidence of convincing and
legitimate self-regulation and governance in the areas of social
responsibility, 2 4 hence staving off potential regulation 25 that may be
crude or burdensome. 26 This also allows corporations to take the
initiative in shaping the agenda and become proactively involved in
shaping social perceptions and perhaps policy. 27
The next objective is to provide processes, postures or outcomes to
engage with the expectations and demands of the market or
stakeholders, 2 8 so that corporations can be perceived as both responsive
and as taking initiatives in shaping the CSR agenda. The governance of
modern enterprise may be characterized by the synergistic interaction
between private or market-based governance and public forms of
governance relying on law or regulation. 29 CSR reporting is arguably a
form of self-regulatory as well as market-based governance, allowing
both the corporation and the users of its CSR reports to shape the
governance of its enterprise. As more emphasis is placed on
standardization in CSR reporting and improvement in the quality and
credibility of reporting, these developments seek to establish for CSR
itself, a conceptualization of its private nature and the credibility of the
power of private governance.
The European Union has tried to facilitate a common approach to
identifying and promoting CSR, 30 but has stopped short of introducing

24. David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social
Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41, 83 (1999); but see Aaron A. Dhir, The Politics ofKnowledge
Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, Shareholder Voice, and Human Rights, 47 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 47, 62 n.58 (2009).
25. Gerard F. Davis et al., The Responsibility Paradox: MultinationalFirms and Global
CorporateSocialResponsibility (U. of Mich. Ross School Working Paper 2006).
26. Hess, supra note 24, at 83.
27. Robert B. Reich, The New Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 8, 16 (1998).

28. Dima Jamali, A Stakeholder Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility: A Fresh
Perspectiveinto Theory and Practice,82 J.Bus. ETHICS 213, 216 (2008).
29.

CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND

DEMOCRACY 295 (Cambridge University Press 2002); see Iris H-Y Chiu, Enhancing
Responsibility in Financial Regulation-Critically Examining the Nature of Public-Private
Governance (pts. 1 &2), 4 L. & FIN. MARKETS REV. 2 (2010), 4 L. & FIN. MARKETS REV. 3
(2010) (discussing public-private governance at length).
30. Commission Green Paper on Promoting a European Frameworkfor Corporate
Social Responsibility, at 7, COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001) ("efforts should focus on
putting the proper regulatory or legislative framework in place in order to define a level playing
field on the basis of which socially responsible practices can be developed.").
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any soft law toward convergence in the CSR for Member States. 3 1
However, the European Union relies on the bottom-up convergence and
standardization in CSR reporting that is taking place across the
corporate sector.32 CSR reporting is not merely to be regarded as an
exercise of information dissemination. What is reported, how it is
reported, and the reception of what is reported are all part of the wider
discourse on framing the conception(s) of CSR itself. In this Article, I
will argue that the developments in standardization and convergence in
CSR reporting may meet those needs of improving the stature and
legitimacy of the self-governance in CSR. But standardization and
convergence in reporting may bring about certain unintended
consequences that could undermine the notion of CSR itself. This would
ultimately affect the credibility of CSR reporting in seeking to establish
a private sphere of governance in CSR.
II. STANDARDIZATION AND CONVERGENCE IN CSR REPORTING
A common criticism of CSR reports may be that they tend to be
selective, subjective, and not comparable. In light of global
developments in standard setting for CSR reporting, one should not
succumb to the simplicity of this criticism. KPMG has reported that an
observed trend is the convergence of CSR reports upon common
international standards, 33 such as the U.N. Global Compact, 34 the
Equator Principles for financial institutions,3 5 the Global Reporting
Initiative standards, 36 such as G3 standards, 37 and the AA1000 standards
developed by the non-profit organization AccountAbility.38 However,
the most popular reporting template may arguably be the GRI, as it
presents a comprehensive and inclusive array of CSR issues identified

31. Id. at 23 ("[a]t this stage the Commission does not with to [make] .
proposals for action.").
32. Id. at 21.
33.

.

. corporate

KPMG INTERNATIONAL, supra note 19, at 35.

34. See U.N. Global Compact, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutthegc/
thetenprinciples/index.html.
35. See The Equator Principles (2001), available at http://www.equator-principles.com/
documents/Equator Principles.pdf.
36. See Global Reporting Initiative, Reporting Framework Overview, available at
http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/ReportingFrameworkDownloads/.
37.

See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES (2006),

http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/2619F3AD-0166-4C7C-8FB2-D8BB3C5F801F/
0/G3_GuidelinesENU.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
38. See AccountAbility, http://www.accountability.org/publications.aspx?id=402 (last
visited Oct. 19, 2010).
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for reporting, plus specific guidelines for industries such as financial
services, energy, or mining.
Further, a number of companies have started to produce CSR ratings
to help asset managers screen for socially responsible investment
opportunities.40 Empirical evidence indicates that socially responsible
investing is on the rise,4 1 and the U.N. Principles for Responsible
Investment further encourages global convergence in the investment
approach of putting emphasis on social performance.4 2 The social
responsibility ratings industry provides a service to assist sociall'
responsible investors to screen their potential investee companies.
KLD, a company now acquired as part of the Risk Metrics group, has
developed a popularly used Global Socrates database that produces CSR
reports for a large number of globally listed companies, and has also
rolled out a rating system from "C to AAA" for the corporate social
performance of companies." Experts in Responsible Investment
Solutions (EIRIS) has developed Corporate Sustainability ratings on a
45
scale of 1-5 that could be tailored to meet the needs of asset managers.
The corporate social performance sector is rowing, with a number of
companies46 providing such evaluation4 and rating services.48
Standardization and convergence in CSR reporting also reinforces the
credibility and comparability of ratings, as rating agencies inevitably
derive part of their evaluation from publicly reported information put
out by companies.
It is also observed that companies endeavor to improve the
39.
40.
41.
42.

KPMG INTERNATIONAL, supra note 19, at 36-38.
Lin, supra note 17, at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
AUGUSTIN LANDIER & VINAY B. NAIR, INVESTING FOR CHANGE: PROFIT FROM

43.
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 130 (Oxford U. Press 2009).
44. KLD RESEARCH & ANALYTICS, ESG RESEARCH AND RATINGS METHODOLOGY 9

(2009), http://www.kld.com/research/socrates/img/KLD%20Methodology/
2009.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).

20and%20Ratings

45. SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT RESEARCH ANALYST NETWORK, A REVIEW OF ESG
PRACTICES IN LARGE EMERGING MARKET COMPANIES 6-7 (2009), available at

www.eiris.org/files/research%20publications/emergingmarketsmar09.pdf (last visited Nov. 30,
2010).
46. Bertelsmann Foundation, Who is Who in CorporateSocial Responsibility Rating? A
Survey of Internationally Established Rating Systems that Measure Corporate Responsibility
(2006), available at http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/bst/de/media/Transparenzstudie2006.

pdf [hereinafter Bertelsmann Foundation].
47.

A range of evaluation methodologies and ratings services are mentioned in J. Emil

Morhardt et al., Scoring CorporateEnvironmental and SustainabilityReports Using GRI 2000,
ISO 14031 and Other Criteria,9 CORP. Soc. RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT. 215 (2002).
48. Bertelsmann Foundation, supra note 46; see Morhardt et al., supra note 47, at 222
(describing a range of evaluation methodologies and ratings and services).
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credibility of their CSR reports by seeking third party assurance for
such reports.4 9 Hence, the assurance industry is also growing and
developing methodologies and standards for assuring the integrity and
reliability of CSR reports.50 For example, AccountAbility has developed
an assurance standard, AA1000AS, 5 that provides that assurance
services can be provided in respect of CSR reporting complying with
AAl000 reporting guidelines, the levels of assurance that can be made
and on what bases, as well as the duties and competence expected of
persons undertaking an assurance engagement.5 2 The AAl000AS is
currently undergoing further revision from its first release in 2008.53
The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB)
has also developed the ISAE3000 54 as an assurance standard to provide
for how an engagement for assurance may be entered into, carried out,
as well as the levels of assurance that may be provided and upon what
bases. 5 The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is also
introducing its ISO 26000 as a voluntary set of guidelines for companies
to adopt socially responsible processes, but has stopped short of
assuming the status of a certification standard. 56
The three key trends mentioned above not only show that CSR
reports are gaining a distinct identity of their own, but that the
supporting industries for standardization, ratings, and assurance are also
developing rapidly to reinforce and provide CSR reports with at least an
impression of credibility and reliability. These trends are arguably a
response to various developments at the micro, meso, national, and
transnational levels. 57
Aguilera et al. argue that at the micro level, individuals are gaining
greater awareness of sustainability issues in relation to climate change,
49.

KPMG INTERNATIONAL, supra note 19, at 62.

50. Id.
51. Henry Schafer et al., Who is Who in CorporateSocial Responsibility Rating? (2006),
http://www.accountability21.net/uploadedFiles/publications/AA1OOOAS%202008.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
52.

See ACCOUNTABILITY, AAl000 ASSURANCE STANDARD 2008 (2008), http://www.

Accountability21.net/uploadedFiles/publications/AAlOOOAS%202008.pdf (last visited Oct. 19,
2010).
53. Id. at 5.
54. International Standard on Assurance Engagements 3000, http://www.Accountability
21 .net/uploadedFiles/Issues/ISAE_3000.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
55.

INT'L ACCOUNTING

ENGAGEMENTS

3000:

STANDARDS

ASSURANCE

BD., INTERNATIONAL

ENGAGEMENTS OTHER THAN

ON ASSURANCE

STANDARD
AUDITS

OR REVIEWS

OF

HISTORICAL FINANCIAL INFORMATION 1f 7-9, http://www.accountability2l.net/uploadedFiles/

Issues/ISAE_3000.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
56.

INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION

FOR

STANDARDIZATION,

ISO

AND

SOCIAL

RESPONSIBILITY (2008), http://www.iso.org/iso/socialresponsibility.pdf (last visited Oct. 19,
2010).
57. See Aguilera et al., supranote 15.
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and the social impact of corporate activities following well-publicized
scandals of corporate failures such as Worldcom and Enron.5 ' At the
meso level, corporate organizational culture has been affected by the
movements of business ethics 59 and risk management,6 0 and senior
management have arguably become more keenly aware of the
environmental and social impact of corporate activities, as part of
general strategic, risk, and business management.61 Information
asymmetry between the corporation and those on the outside is being
overcome not only by what the corporation discloses, but by myriad
sources of information whether in the media, regulatory, academic, or
other spheres.6 2
Greater availability of information has helped to draw out
stakeholder responses, which often act as external pressures upon
corporations. 63 Empirical research shows that as firms respond to social
performance information and ratings put out about them, those that have
fared poorly tend to respond significantly in order to improve
reputational perception. As a result, CSR reporting and ratings do
seem to have a significant effect upon corporate behavior and social
performance, such pressures performing a role of incentivizing reflexive
self-regulation on the part of corporations. 65
At the national level, a number of jurisdictions (e.g., France and
Denmark) have introduced mandatory CSR reporting legislation, 66 and
Norway has enacted legislation to improve gender equality on Boards of
Directors. 67 In order to stave off further regulation, corporate behavior
58.

See Aguilera et al., supra note 15, at 8-15.

59.

See TIMOTHY

L.

FORT,

ETHICS AND

GOVERNANCE:

BUSINESS

AS

MEDIATING

INSTITUTION (Oxford U. Press 2001); see also Michael Segon & Christopher Booth, Business
Ethics and CSR as Part of MBA Curricula:An Analysis of Student Preference, 5 INT'L REV.
Bus. RES. PAPERS 72 (2009).
60. See generally PARKER, supra note 29; see also CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT
(David H. Chew ed., Columbia U. Press 2008); see also MICHAEL POWER, ORGANIZED
UNCERTAINTY: DESIGNING A WORLD OF RISK MANAGEMENT (Oxford U. Press 2007).

61. See Beth Kytle & John Gerard Ruggie, Corporate Social Responsibility as Risk
Management: A Model for Multinationals (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Harvard U.,
Working Paper No. 10, 2005), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/
publications/workingpaper _10kytle ruggie.pdf.
62. See Aaron K. Chatterji & Michael W. Toffel, How Firms Respond to Being Rated,31
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 917 (2010).

63. See Dhir, supra note 24, at 47.
64. See Chatterji & Toffel, supra note 62.
65. David Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A
Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 379,428-30 (2005); Hess, supra note 24,
at 65-67.
66. See supra text accompanying note 21.
67. See Norway's Mixed-gender Boardrooms, Norway.org (summarizing the Norwegian
legislation), at http://www.eu-norway.org/news/genderrepboardrooms/.
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is changing to take social responsibility more seriously. 68 At the
national level, existing national regulatory systems and jurisprudence
may also be interpreted in new ways to support CSR. This is illustrated
in the American case of Nike v. Kasky, where a shareholder sought to
impugn the salutary picture painted in Nike's annual report as being
inconsistent with the reality of sweatshop conditions in Nike's supply
chain. 69 At the transnational level, nongovernmental organizations, and
international bodies such as the United Nations (Global Compact,
Principles for Responsible Investing), the OECD (guidelines for MultiNational Enterprises and Corporate Governance), the International
Labour Organisation, and the U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development, all contribute not only to awareness of the agenda for
social responsibility, but to behavioral change on the part of
corporations and regulators.
The rise of socially responsible investing also brings institutional
investor power to bear as institutions are setting aside increasing
amounts of investment for socially responsible companies, and
companies are increasingly motivated to improve their social
performance in order to attract such investment.7 0 However, the level of
shareholder proposals related to corporate social responsibility remains
low,7 1 as there are procedural difficulties in enabling any individual
shareholder to table a proposal to be voted upon at the general meeting.
Further, such proposals may be regarded as having been successfully
brought up if support of up to 10% can be garnered for them. 72
Such empirical data indicates that shareholder activism for corporate
social responsibility has not exactly become mainstream, but this may
nevertheless be an important source of influence for companies to
engage with CSR. Nongovernmental organizations and stakeholder
groups that can galvanize action through borderless communication
over the Internet are also a growing source of social pressure, termed as
68. See Conley & Williams, supra note 16, at 1.
69. David Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate Performance: The
MaterialEdges of Social and EnvironmentalDisclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151, 193-95
(2004); Michele Sutton, Between a Rock and a Judicial Hard Place: Corporate Social
Responsibility Reporting and PotentialLegal Liability Under Kasky v. Nike, 72 UMKC L. REV.
1159, 1169-72 (2004).
70. Lin, supra note 17, at 5-7. However, it is also observed that SRI is still a minority
player in the investment markets, and possibly accounts for only about 10% of institutional
funds worldwide. See Allison M. Snyder, Holding Multinational CorporationsAccountable: Is
Non-FinancialDisclosurethe Answer?, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 565 (2007).
71. Robert Monks et al., Shareholder Activism on Environmental Issues: A Study of
Proposals at Large US Corporations (2000-2003), 28 NAT. RESOURCES FORUM 317 (2004);
Anastasia O'Rourke, A New Politics ofEngagement: ShareholderActivism for CorporateSocial
Responsibility, 12 Bus. STRATEGY & ENV'T 227 (2003).
72. Monks et al., supra note 71, at 324.
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"social risk,"" for corporations. Hence, the convergence and
standardization in CSR reporting, and the ratings and assurance
industries may be a response to the convergence of global forces,
motivations, and perceptions regarding what CSR is and why it is
important.
Standardization and convergence in CSR reporting has made the
hackneyed criticisms against the selective and non-comparable nature of
CSR reports less and less relevant. How does standardization reinforce
or support the voluntary and self-regulatory nature of many CSR issues?
It could be argued that standardization in CSR reporting may give the
impression that we have arrived at an agreed and graspable concept of
CSR performance evaluation, and that CSR reporting provides that
information in an increasingly credible way. We would increasingly be
persuaded to embrace the apparent convergence in the concept of CSR
performance, especially in the way corporations report theirs. However,
can it be argued that one cannot make the connection between
standardization and convergence in reporting, and our conception of
what CSR comprises and how it should be evaluated? Standardization
and convergence in CSR reporting does not necessarily prescribe for
our independent minds how to perceive CSR and CSR performance.
However, the technocratic weight of standard-setting bodies such as
GRI, which is independent of the corporate sector, and increasing
adoption by corporations of standardized reporting templates, would go
a long way toward persuading us to accept the wider implications of
standardization in legitimizing corporations' conception of CSR
performance and the legitimacy of their self-regulatory governance in
CSR issues that are unregulated.
CSR performance remains an elusive concept on many levels-from
the ideological to the various methodologies in capturing proxy
indicators for CSR performance. CSR performance may be based on
specific indicators such as toxic emissions or carbon footprints, or an
aggregate of indicators similar to the approach with the KLD Global
Socrates rankings. CSR performance may be based on popular opinions
such as the results of polls and surveys.
CSR performance may be based on stakeholder perceptions, and
levels of satisfaction. CSR performance may also be measured by
reference to the processes and policies companies are committed to, or
may be evaluated by reference to outcomes. The variety of possibilities
in CSR performance evaluation stems from the complex nature of CSR
itself.
CSR could be based on any of the following representations of the
corporation: the corporation as a social citizen whose legitimacy is
73.

See Kytle & Ruggie, supra note 61.
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based on social value and hence its performance is based on social
good;7 4 or an essentially economic institution whose CSR performance
is strategically beneficial to further its economic purposes, even if social
benefits beyond the privately economic benefits are achieved.
However, standardization and convergence in CSR reporting edges
close to having a "universalist" perspective of CSR. This emphasis
assists the development of the corporate social performance ratings and
assurance industries, and these industries' work may further provide an
overly glib impression of the measurability and evaluation of a
"universalist" conception of CSR performance.
The standardization and convergence in CSR reporting will arguably
serve to facilitate a perception of CSR performance that is
impressionistic and ultimately corporate-centric for its strategic
purposes. Corporations may think that this impression is key to
sustaining the largely self-regulatory nature of many CSR issues that are
unregulated. In sum, the argument is that standardization and
convergence in CSR reporting that supports a "universalist" conception
of CSR performance may be overly glib but successful in managing
market-based governance from the demand side of CSR reporting (i.e.,

user stakeholders). This Article argues that the ramifications and
unintended consequences from standardization would ultimately
undermine the effectiveness of market-based governance on the demand
side, and will in turn raise questions of the legitimacy of corporate selfregulatory governance in these areas. The Article will first explore
whether standardization and convergence in CSR reporting is likely to
entail these unintended consequences. I will then explore, in Part IV, a
gentle reform to CSR reporting to address those problems.

III. THE MEANING

OF SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND THE
CONSEQUENCES OF STANDARDIZATION AND CONVERGENCE

According to John Elkington, the founder of the concept of "triple
bottom line" reporting, social performance means: "In the simplest
terms, the [triple bottom line] agenda focuses corporations not just on
the economic value that they add, but also on the environmental and
social value that they add-or destroy." 76 Hence, it is arguable that
74. But there are also many competing views of "citizenship," in terms of how
individualistic, communitarian or universalist the term may mean. See Jeremy Moon et al., Can
Corporationsbe Citizens? Corporate Citizenship as a Metaphorfor Business Participationin
Society, 15 Bus. ETics Q. 427 (2005).
75. See Abagail McWilliams et al., Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategic
Implications,43 J. MGMT. STUD. 1 (2006).
76. See Elkington, supra note 4.
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social performance means the social benefits and costs of the
corporations' activities, beyond economic value. However, both social
benefit and cost is difficult to evaluate quantitatively and qualitatively.
The GDP may be a measure of a country's economic well-being, but it
assumes that consumption is sacred and fails to take into account the
costs of consumption, particularly waste.7 7 On the whole, it is difficult
to achieve any comprehensive and credible measure of well-being or
societal harm that is both quantitative and qualitative in nature. Hence,
"social performance" is measured according to proxy indicators of wellbeing or harm, such indicators may be "input" based or "output" based.
Input-based indicators include looking at what corporate policies
there are regarding corporate commitment to CSR, whether companies
78
have processes, personnel, and resources devoted to CSR, whether
they have performance indicators for aspects of CSR and monitor their
own performance, whether stakeholder participation and dialogue is
carried out,79 and so on. Input-based indicators thus deal with what a
corporation seems to be carrying out in pursuing CSR, and not what a
corporation has achieved in aspects of CSR. Output-based indicators
refer to the outcomes or effects of a company's CSR activities, or
implementation of its input-based processes and procedures. Specific
quantifiable output-based indicators may be carbon footprint, quantity
of recycling and waste, level of emissions, frequency and level of
employee turnover, representation of equality in employee profiles,
supply chain labor conditions, and so on. The GRI and KLD capture
some of these specific quantifiable outcomes. However, where a
corporation may be involved in the generation of social cost, for
example, by engaging in corruption in a third world country, the social
cost is difficult to measure, as the effects may be both wide-ranging and
indirect. A number of eminent academics have also developed "holistic"
models for CSR performance to be measured. Carroll argues that a
three-dimensional model can be constructed to measure CSR
performance.80 First, companies are thought to be concerned with four
categories of CSR matters, from economic to legal, then ethical, and
then philanthropic concerns.8 1 Then, Carroll suggests that a company's
responsiveness to any particular matter may be plotted along a spectrum
77.

See JOSEPH STIGLITZ ET AL., REPORT BY THE COMMISSION ON THE MEASUREMENT OF

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS (2009), available at http://media.ft.com/cms/

f3b4c24a-al41-1 lde-a88d-00l44feabdc0.pdf.
78. These are important too, for example, GRI, AA1000, and the KLD ratings.
79. See Martin O'Connor & Joachim H. Spangenberg, A Methodology for CSR
Reporting: Assuring a Representative Diversity of IndicatorsAcross Stakeholders, Scales, Sites
andPerformance Issues, 16 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 1399 (2008).

80.
81.

See Carroll,supra note 1, at 499.
Id.at500.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

13

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 2

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

374

[Vol. 22

from defensiveness, with no response, to being accepting and
proactive.82 Finally, a particular CSR issue should be identified such as
consumer, labor, or environmental, and then matched with the type of
concern and the company's responsiveness to determine the CSR
performance of the company. 83 Wood has also proposed a model that
takes into account individual, organizational, and institutional factors
driving a company's responsiveness, matched with its internal processes
and systems, and externally observed implementation and outcomes to
and
applications
However,
determine
CSR performance.84
implementations of CSR performance models are not exactly precise
and straightforward.
Standardization in CSR indicates which areas or issues are in the
realm of CSR, and standardized templates for reporting show the way
for evaluating CSR performance, whether input-based, output-based, or
based on surveys or opinions. On the one hand, these developments may
provide certainty in the construction of CSR as a form of governance or
an academic or practical discipline. On the other hand, standardization
and convergence in CSR reporting may obscure difficult and
contestable issues in defining what CSR performance is. We could
become uncritical in accepting the validity and reliability of the
standardized indicators of CSR performance, but we would risk
forgetting that indicators have been developed to achieve only
approximate evaluations of social good and social harm.
Further, social good or social harm may be regarded differently
based on the different cultures in different countries. Steurer and
Konrad write that central and eastern European states may be indifferent
to the lack of voluntary or charity involvement on the part of
corporations, but western European countries treat such involvement as
being an indicator of positive CSR.86 Chen and Bouvain also observe
that countries with an Anglo-American economic system treat consumer
and shareholder interests as being of paramount importance in CSR, but
less liberal economies may treat relations with the government and
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 501-02.
Id. at 504.
See Wood, supra note 2, at 691.
See Tombs B. Ramos & Sandra Caeiro, Meta-performance Evaluation of
SustainabilityIndicators, 10 ECOLOGICAL INDICATORs 157 (2010) (arguing that it is necessary to
perform meta-evaluations of these indicators to ensure their continued relevance, coherence,
effectiveness and justifiability in application). The authors have developed about twenty
benchmarks in order to achieve a template for meta-evaluation of sustainability indicators. Id. at
162-65.
86. Reinhard Steurer & Astrid Konrad, Business-Society Relations in Central-Eastern
and Western Europe: How Those Who Lead in Sustainability Reporting Bridge the Gap in
Corporate(Social) Responsibility, 25 SCANDINAVIAN J. MGMT. 23 (2009).
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regulators as being of greater importance.87 Anglo-American economies
also tend to treat good financial performance as being part of positive
CSR, and are keen to establish that CSR is positively correlated with
financial performance, although China and Japan may regard business
ethics and moral practices as being of paramount importance to CSR.8 9
Further, Aras and Crowther suggest that corporations may have
refrained the term "sustainability" to mean something fundamentally
different from the social good of maintaining the planet's resources-to
the ability of the corporation to maintain the continuation of its
activities. In spite of the movement toward standardization and
convergence in CSR indicators, it remains important to bear in mind the
notions of social good and social harm we are trying to perceive and
evaluate, in order to critically ascertain what the standardization and
convergence trends are going to achieve.
There are two main arguments that this Article will make in order to
show that standardization and convergence in CSR reporting entails
unintended consequences that will diminish the stature of its selfregulatory nature. The first argument is that the standardization and
convergence in CSR reporting, such as the GRI reporting template, is
based on "inclusiveness" in identifying CSR issues. Such inclusiveness
is a very thin form that may lead to generic and nondescript reporting,
and allows corporations to primarily use the CSR report in pursuit of the
business case. The second argument is that the standardization and
convergence may prematurely provide glib and overly-confident
perceptions of what CSR performance is, resulting in management of
demand side perceptions. Such perception management of the demand
side is increasingly being reinforced by rating providers, journalistic
opinions, and polls and assurance providers. Market-based governance
87. See Stephen Chen & Petra Bouvain, Is Corporate Responsibility Converging? A
Comparison of CorporateResponsibility Reporting in the USA, UK, Australia,and Germany, 87
J. Bus. ETHics 299 (2009).

88. See Jeffrey P. Katz et al., The Impact ofExternal Monitoringand PublicReporting on
Business Performance in a Global ManufacturingIndustry, 48 Bus. & Soc'Y 489 (2009); see
also R. Perumal & R. Ramakrishnan, FinancialPerformance and Stakeholder Management
but see Peter
(2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1091547;
deMaCarty, FinancialReturns of CorporateSocial Responsibility, and the Moral Freedom and
Responsibility of Business Leaders, 114 Bus. & Soc'Y REv. 393 (2009); see Hasan Fauzi,
CorporateSocial and FinancialPerformance:EmpiricalEvidence from American Companies,
GLOBSYN MGMT. J. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfim?abstract id= 1489494; see Rim Makni Gargouri et al., CausalityBetween Corporate
Social Performance and FinancialPerformance: Evidence from Canadian Firms, 89 J. Bus.
ETHcs 409 (2008).

89. See Adam J. Sulkowski et al., CorporateResponsibility Reporting in China, India,
Japan,and the West: One Mantra Does Not FitAll, 42 NEw ENG. L. REv. 787 (2008).
90. Giller Aras & David Crowther, Corporate Sustainability Reporting: A Study in
Disingenuity?, 87 J. Bus. ETHics 279, 280-81 (2009).
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from the demand side may thus be weak and uncritical, and this risks
the eventual credibility and integrity of the self-regulatory nature of
CSR reporting and performance in areas that are unregulated.
A. StandardizationandInclusiveness
Taking the first argument, that standardization and convergence in
CSR reporting is very much based on an inclusiveness approach, the
GRI states quite clearly that the G3 reporting framework is "applicable
to organizations of any size or type, and from any sector or geographic
region" and is "developed through a process of systematic, consensusseeking dialogue with a large network of individuals from over 60
countries, representing stakeholder groups including business, civil
society, academia, labor and other professional institutions."91 "The
process is open, inclusive and takes a global perspective on the growing
understanding of good reporting on key sustainability issues."9 2 It is
arguable that the G3 reporting framework approximates towards a
construction of a "universalist" view of what the CSR issues are, but
such a "universalist" view is ultimately achieved only by inclusiveness,
which means taking on board all or most of the views and concerns of a
wide range of stakeholders worldwide. Although "inclusiveness" is
supported by notions of democracy and transparency, there may be
weaknesses in this approach to discerning the social benefits and costs
of a corporation's activities.
"Inclusiveness" has also found its way in legal articulation of
standards of corporate governance in the United Kingdom. The UK
Companies Act 2006 for example, attempts to reconcile the primacy of
shareholders to companies and other long-term and stakeholder
concerns in its articulation of the director's duty to promote the longterm success of the company. 93 This legal duty requires directors to
promote the long term success of the company for the benefit of the
members as a whole, but in doing so, directors must consider the list of
stakeholder interests in section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006.94
Commentators doubt that the legal duty of the director goes beyond
91. Global Reporting Initiative, supra note 36.
92. Id.
93. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 § 172 (U.K.). This is referred to as the enlightened
shareholder value model of the company where short-term shareholder primacy is rejected in
place of an adapted form of shareholder primacy that respects stakeholder interests; but see Paul
L. Davies, Cassel Professor of Commercial Law, London Sch. of Econ. and Political Science,
Lecture at the U. of Melbourne Law Sch.: "Enlightened Shareholder Value and the New
Responsibilities of Directors" (Oct. 4, 2005) (arguing that this is not very different from a
shareholder approach); but see Demetra Arsalidou, Shareholder Primacy in Cl 173 of the
Companies Bill 2006, 28(3) COMPANY LAW. 67 (2006).
94. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172 (U.K.).
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accountability to shareholders, and that a director's consideration of
stakeholder interests would likely be subsumed as part of overall
diligent management or acting in good faith in business judgment. 95
Even if the director's duty to promote long term success of the
company implicitly requires some form of taking into account
stakeholders' interests, and possibly stakeholder engagement,9 6 the
inclusive list of stakeholders in section 172 of the Companies Act may
make it impracticable for courts to require any particular form of intense
consideration or engagement. Hence, the value of "inclusiveness" may
be doubtful if this encourages corporations to engage in a superficial
and box-ticking exercise in identifying stakeholders and their interests,
and the corporation's consideration of, and engagement with,
stakeholders' interests may be inevitably "thinned" out. The
inclusiveness approach to standardization and convergence in CSR
reporting may also suffer from the same weakness. In seeking to
address and report on a wide variety of matters that are also universally
applicable to all businesses across sectors and geographical locations, a
corporation's CSR report is likely to report thinly on all matters and
attain generic and common features.
The general nature of CSR reports may fail to capture peculiar CSR
issues that are unique to the individual corporation.
A large supermarket PLC reports:
We are committed to championing equality, diversity, inclusion
and flexible working options for our colleagues. We remain
committed to recruiting, retaining and engaging the best people,
from backgrounds that reflect the communities we serve. We
believe that every colleague, no matter where they work or the
role they perform, should be encouraged to develop and make
best use of their skills. We value the opinions of our colleagues
and we communicate honestly with them. We also believe in
recognising and rewarding our colleagues for the vital part they
play in making . .. a great place to work.9 7

95. See Andrew Keay, Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006: An Interpretationand
Assessment, 28 COMPANY LAW. 106 (2007); see John Lowry, The Duty of Loyalty of Company
Directors: Bridging the Accountability Gap Through Efficient Disclosure, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
607 (2009); but see Daniel Attenborough, The Company Law Reform Bill: An Analysis of
Directors' Duties and the Objective of the Company, 27 COMPANY LAw. 162 (2006) (arguing
that the courts may need evidence of directors' consideration of stakeholder interests and such a
requirement may then result in a de facto imposition of a duty to consider).
96. Attenborough, supra note 95.
97. J. SAINSBURY PLC, ANNUAL REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2010: CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY REVIEW 5 (2010), available at http://www.j-sainsbury.co.uk/arl0/downloads/

pdf/SainsburysARIOresponsibilityreview.pdf#page=2.
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The generic features of the reports may not highlight issues such as
the salary differential between the highest and lowest paid employees,
the employment of casual and student labor particularly in
supermarkets, or whether the call center sales forces in the
telecommunications company are overseas or UK-based. The
inclusivity in standardization and convergence of CSR reporting may
entail thin but wide ranging discussions that present a diffuse picture of
a company's overall impression of CSR so that nothing in particular
stands out. Mikkili and Toppinen98 are surprised at how similar CSR
reports of businesses in totally different geographical locations and
cultures may look. 99 This brings to question whether the generality
therefore lends a nondescript nature to corporations' CSR reports which
provide "safety" from being highlighted or targeted.
Blowfield warns that the unquestioning acceptance of the values of
inclusiveness or universalism in CSR risks undermining the critical
abilities in CSR as a robust discipline:
[T]he emphasis placed on consensus allows CSR to present itself
as inclusive, accommodating different perspectives and
promising "win-win" outcomes for diverse and hitherto often
hostile entities. As I will discuss later, these premises about
diversity, equal partnership and inclusiveness are part of CSR's
weakness, but they are in line with postmodernist theory where
difference is regarded as unproblematic. This allows CSR to
present opposing ideas as coherent and complementary. It also
allows companies to claim to engage in complex issues such as
sustainability, environmental management, social justice, animal
rights, governance and cultural diversity without any real
discussion or recognition of the possibility that aspects of such
.100
issues might be ideationally or axiologically contradictory ...
The portrayal of success as something non-conflictual is indicative of
how CSR views dissent as a perversion. 1o
Further, the inclusiveness of the GRI reporting framework is
arguably a "thin" form of inclusiveness. As the GRI reporting
framework needs to appeal to all, the framework is broad and wide but
it does not capture the quality, intensity, and details of reporting, and
therefore "leaves a legacy of unresolved tensions" in how all the CSR
98. Mirja Mikkildi & Anne Toppinen, CorporateResponsibility Reporting by Large Pulp
and Paper Companies, 10 FOREST POL'Y & EcON. 500 (2008).
99. Id.
100. Michael Blowfield, CorporateSocial Responsibility: The FailingDisciplineand Why
it Mattersfor InternationalRelations, 19 INT'L REL. 173, 177 (2005).
101. Id. at 181.
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issues are weighed, balanced, and explored.102 Hence, companies still
have plenty of discretion in reporting, and they may converge on nondescript, vague but generally positive reporting, or there may be
specific reporting by companies of matters that may not ultimately be
comparable.
Academic research is rich in finding out what motivates companies
to report in a certain quantitative and qualitative manner. For example,
stakeholder pressures such as those from environmental groups are
often important in influencing the devotion of quantity and quality in
CSR reporting.' 0 3 The size of a company is also important in
determining the quantity and quality of CSR reports.' 0 Even if
companies may base their reporting on a standardized framework, the
direction and emphasis in the reporting may reflect a number of
different motivations, such as treating the reporting as an exercise in
business language in response to the need to manage perceptions, or
based on management's commitment to ethical business practices and
values. The "thin" inclusiveness in standardized frameworks for
reporting such as the GRI guidelines arguably does not address these
differences in quantity and quality of reporting and hence the
impression of comparability may be overrated.
The genericity and universalization of CSR reporting also reminds
one of the standardization in financial reporting across companies in
order to provide comparability for the investment market. 0 5 The
standardization in financial reporting assists in the commoditization of
corporate securities. Is the standardization in CSR reporting also for
strategic purposes, to support a market for virtue, perhaps from the
points of view of branding and marketing,1 06 socially responsible
investment, and even as part of a corporation's risk profile in credit
worthiness?
102. Halina Szejnwald Brown et al., The Rise of the Global Reporting Initiative:A Case of
InstitutionalEntrepreneurship,18 ENVTL. POL. 182, 182-83 (2009).
103. Rob Gray et al., CorporateSocial and Environmental Reporting: A Review of the
Literature and a Longitudinal Study of UK Disclosure,8 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY
J. 47, 52-57 (1995).
104. Id.; Arieh A. Ullmann, Data in Search of a Theory: A CriticalExamination of the
Relationships Among Social Performance, Social Disclosure, and Economic Performance of
U.S. Firms, 10 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 540, 541, 548 (1985); Pamela Kent & Christopher Chan,
Application of Stakeholder Theory to the Quantity and Quality of Australian Voluntary
Corporate Environmental Disclosures, 1, 15-16 (2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=44790 1; Alan Muller & Ans Kolk, Extrinsic and Intrinsic Drivers
of CorporateSocial Performance:Evidencefrom Foreign and Domestic Firms in Mexico, 47 J.
MGMT. STUD. 1, 2, 5-8 (2010) (arguing that management disposition toward ethical business
behaviour is a driver toward the quantity and quality of CSR reporting).
105.

See CHARLOTTE VILLIERS, COMPANY LAW AND CORPORATE REPORTING 125-201

(Cambridge U. Press 2006).
106. Siegel & Vitaliano, supra note 17, at 773.
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B. Standardizationas Reinforcing the Strategic Purposeof CSR
Standardization and convergence in CSR reporting may be a
reflection of convergence in supply side and demand side perspectives,
and it is arguable that such convergence is found to support the strategic
purpose of the CSR report.' 07 The 2009 KPMG Reader's Choice Survey
found that the company's CSR report chiefly affects decisions for
investors whether to invest in a particular company, or decisions for
contractors whether to enter into economic relations with a company, or
decisions for potential acquirers in the market for corporate control. 0 8
Hence, on the demand side, the role of the CSR report seems to be
instrumental in nature, for the indication of certain characteristics of the
company that have an economic dimension.
The growth of socially responsible investing and the approach of
mainstream institutional investors taking into account social
responsibility in investee companies has also made the research issue of
social performance and its connection with financial performance an
important one.109 The general trend in CSR is that most businesses
"[implement] . . . a CSR strategy with a rationale of protecting corporate

reputation and earnings."110 Hence, the strategic approach to CSR"'
seems to be the point of convergence between perspectives from the
supply side (i.e., the corporations) and the demand side (i.e., investors,
potential acquirers, contractors, and even creditors).
107. Judy Brown & Michael Fraser, Approaches and Perspectives in Social and
Environmental Accounting: An Overview of the Conceptual Landscape, 15 Bus. STRATEGY &
ENv'T 103, 104-07 (2006); Siegel & Vitaliano, supra note 17, at 774-75.
108. KPMG & ACCoUNTABILITY, COUNT ME IN, THE READERS' TAKE ON SUSTAINABILITY
REPORTING: A REPORT OF THE GRI READERS' CHOICE SURVEY, 1, 15-16, 26 (2009), available at

http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/3F57ACC8-60DO-48FO-AF28-527F85A2A4B4/
0/CountMeln.pdf (indicating that readers' preferences and motivations in reading or not reading
CSR reports and what readers hope to see in CSR reports is largely economic, even though the
readers are drawn from a broad range including business and civil society) [hereinafter KPMG
& ACCOUNTABILITY, COUNT ME IN].

109. See Marc Orlitzky, Links Between Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate
Financial Performance: Theoretical and Empirical Determinants, in 2 CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: PERFORMANCE AND STAKEHOLDERS 41 (Jos6 Allouche ed., Palgrave Macmillan

Publishers 2006) [hereinafter CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY]; see also Laura Poddi &
Sergio Vergalli, Does CorporateSocial Responsibility Affect the Performance of Firms?(2009),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1444333; see also Katz et al., supra note 88, at 489
(supporting a generally positive correlation); but see Michael L. Barnett & Robert M. Salomon,

Beyond Dichotomy: The CurvilinearRelationship Between Social Responsibility and Financial
Performance, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1101, 1101-02, 1113 (2006) (suggesting ambiguous
findings where the correlation is indeterminate).

I10. Peter Pruzan, Spirituality as a Basis for CSR, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 532 (Andrew Crane et al., eds., Oxford U. Press 2008); see

also Brown & Fraser, supra note 107 (examining critically the motivations for CSR reporting).
111.

McWilliams et al., supra note 75, at 1-2.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol22/iss3/2

20

Chiu: Standardizaiton in Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting and

2010]1

STANDARDIZATION INCORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING

38 1

The recent GRI surveyll 2 on how CSR reports are read and used
shows a surprisingly significant amount of convergence in what readers
regard as useful and important.11 3 Readers generally affirm the value of
the standardized items for disclosure in the G3 guidelines.'1 4 However,
the GRI survey also shows that other civil society stakeholders view
concerns such as stakeholder engagement to be still inadequately
addressed. "5
It could even be argued that there may gradually be a case of CSR
reporting becoming price-sensitive in the short term if the ramifications
of the American decision of Kasky v. Nike are further explored. In
Kasky v. Nike,"' 6 Marc Kasky issued a private attorney-general action
against Nike, alleging that its CSR reports of responsible labour
conditions in its supply chain were misrepresented. 117 Nike tried to
defend its statements under the constitutional right of free speech but
the court eventually held that the CSR reports were commercial."' 8 The
case eventually settled, but the commercial nature of the CSR report had
been noted.1 9 In light of the increasing importance of the business case
to CSR and companies being engaged in CSR reporting for that
purpose, would the strategic nature of CSR reports entail its eventual
classification as material and price-sensitive information for investment
purposes in due course? It is to be noted that in the United Kingdom,
information relating to management of stakeholder interests is required
to be part of the directors' business review, 120 and hence there is room
for courts to regard such information as having the same weight of
materiality as traditional financial disclosure. However, the European
Union Transparency Abuse Directive,121 which regulates ongoing
disclosure of securities information to the markets, does not include
such stakeholder information.122 Hence, it remains to be seen if CSR
reporting may become part of the landscape of securities regulation in
the United Kingdom.
The strategic nature of CSR reporting will likely continue to
influence the gradual standardization of CSR reporting. These
developments also increasingly define for us an economic perspective to
112.

113.
114.
115.
116.
of court.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

KPMG & AcCOUNTABILITY, COUNT ME IN, supra note 108, at 26.

Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12-13, 16.
Kasky v. Nike, 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002); the case was eventually settled out
Id.
Id. at 259.
Sutton, supra note 69, at 1175-76.
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 417 (Eng.).
Enacted in 2006.
Council Directive 2004/109, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 (EC).
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CSR performance, and CSR performance may form a basis for marketbased governance, especially if socially responsible investing becomes
more significant.
In sum, on the first argument, the standardization and convergence in
CSR reporting based on the value of inclusiveness of all stakeholder
interests may arguably create a generic and universal template for
reporting that is thin, diffuse, non-particular to any business and perhaps
will only go towards commoditizing "virtue" in the pursuit of
corporation's strategic and economic purposes. However, one needs to
observe the future directions in CSR standardization: is standardization
led by voices and groups that are likely able to dominate or capture the
process by means of being focussed on economic concerns,
technocratically competent, resourceful or politically influential? In
particular, corporations are themselves keen to table the indicators that
should be accepted for CSR evaluation.' 23 This Article will argue, in
Part IV, that the process of developing and subjecting CSR indicators to
debate and scrutiny and the framing of the conception of social
performance must continue to be dynamic. Part IV will also argue that
CSR reports and CSR performance should aim to approximately capture
the individualized picture of social benefits and costs resulting from a
corporation's existence and activities. This is key to the effective
exercise of market-based governance which in turn supports the selfregulatory nature of CSR issues that are unregulated.
C. Standardization:PerceptionManagement or CSR Performance?
Standardization and convergence in CSR reporting is likely to
contribute to the building up of market-based governance in CSR issues
that are unregulated, although it is more apparent than real that such
standardization and convergence has moved any closer to achieving a
universalist conception of CSR and its performance. Further, the rise in
rating service providers for CSR performance and the use of assurance
for CSR reports further reinforce impressions that CSR performance
may be determined universally and credibly. Market-based governance
in the form of ratings agencies, journalist opinions and polls, and
assurance providers are heavily derived from the corporation's CSR
report, and such reliance is likely to continue as standardization and
convergence in reporting provides the impression that CSR reporting is
credible. Hence, it will be argued that such market-based governance is
unlikely to be critical and will allow corporations to strategically use the
CSR report for business purposes, instead of showing an individual
reflection upon peculiar social benefits and costs of its corporate
123.

See O'Connor & Spangenberg, supra note 79, at 1399-1400.
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activities.
Fauzi et al.124 explain that CSR performance is usually evaluated by
using one of the following five means: a) evaluation or ratings based on
content analysis of CSR reports; b) specific quantitative measurements
such as pollution indices or toxic emissions; c) perceptual evaluation
based on opinion surveys and polls; d) indicators of corporate reputation
that may be based on popular opinion and poll surveys or industry
surveys and asset manager surveys; and e) aggregate data and rankings
produced by organizations, whether corporate or voluntary. These
different forms of social performance measurements rely on four
different categories of information: the companies' CSR reports;
popular opinions (i.e., aggregate popular wisdom as information); other
organizations' CSR evaluations and rankings; and distinct quantitative
measurements taken for specific issues such as emissions or carbon
footprint.
The five methodologies in social performance evaluation mentioned
earlier are heavily based on information contained in the company's
own CSR report. Although external third party reports, polls, and
surveys are also forms of evaluation, they are also heavily based on
information provided by the company in its own CSR report. The
standardization and convergence of CSR reporting based on the U.N.
Global Compact or GRI guidelines,1 25 operates in the selection of issues
that need reporting, so that CSR is framed along those identified issues,
but the quality, detail, and intensity of reporting may vary greatly
among corporations using the same reporting framework.
Morhardt et al. argue that much CSR reporting is heavily based on
policies and procedures, posturing a form of corporate social
responsiveness, that does not say much about the social effects and
outcomes.126 Van Oosterhout and Heugens have also commented that
evaluations of social performance may be based too heavily on policies,
procedures, and systems reported in CSR reports rather than social
outcomes or empirical effects on the community. 127 Further, corporate
CSR reports also tend to contain laudatory items and may avoid
mentioning more controversial issues.128 However, we may still feel that
124.

Hasan Fauzi et al., "Triple Bottom Line" as "Sustainable CorporatePerformance

A Propositionfor the Future,2 SUSTAINABILITY 1345, 1349 (2010).
125. KPMG INTERNATIONAL, supra note 19, at 9.

126. Morhardt et al., supra note 47, at 228-29 (discussing current corporate environment
report scoring systems and a company's ability to manipulate their score).
127. J. (Hans) van Oosterhout & Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens, Much Ado About Nothing:
A Conceptual Critique of CSR, ERIM REPORT SERIES RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 7-8 (2006),

availableat http://publishing.eur.nl/ir/repub/asset/7894/ERS-2006-040-ORG.pdf.
128. Holder-Webb et al., supra note 17, at 501. Further, some research has also pointed
out that only 40% of companies on the Fortune 100 list may be regarded as living up to their
CSR rhetoric. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for
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a corporation is somewhat socially responsible because it reports, and it
does this according to a standardized framework. A number of
commentators have looked into the perceived management effects of
CSR reporting, and report that positive perception of management is
generally achieved through the strategic use of CSR reporting and
initiatives.129 Hence, does standardization now provide a means for
determining CSR performance, or is it merely a way to frame business
communication in such a way that social responsibility is perceived to
be taken care of?
In Foka's view, there could be a significant difference between the
internally generated CSR data as perceived by the company's officers
and employees, and externally generated data which may represent
stakeholder views regarding the corporation. 130 She argues that a sound
evaluation of social performance could only be achieved if such internal
and external data and perspectives are aggregated for each company.
Banerjee further argues that "CSR is more beneficial for corporations
than for society." 132 Corporations shape the CSR discourse by reporting,
which is supported by standardization in reporting, and they are able to
influence the perception of CSR through the business perspective,
making corporate purposes and objectives an equal stakeholder to other
external stakeholders and their non-business concerns.' 3 3 Hence, CSR
reporting may be able to achieve a persuasion toward an impressionistic
affirmation of a corporation's CSR performance, converging on the
strategic purpose.
Can it be argued that third party providers in the market such as
ratings agencies, journalists, and assurance providers may provide a
"critical check" on CSR reporting and hence a more credible assessment
of CSR performance as posited in reports? In relation to the CSR
evaluation carried out by external bodies or companies, such as the
Actualising Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REv. 771, 796 (2007).
129. See Manuel Castelo Branco & Lucia Lima Rodrigues, Exploring the Importance of
Social Responsibility Disclosurefor Human Resources, 13 J. HUM. RES. COST & AccT. 186, 191
(2009) (indicating that labor market perceptions provide companies a competitive edge and
disclosing CSR information can provide a positive basis for such); Sandro Castaldo et al., The
Missing Link Between CorporateSocial Responsibility and Consumer Trust: The Case of Fair
Trade Products, 84 J. Bus. ETHICS 1, 1 (2009) (theorizing that consumers are attracted to
companies with a positive social and ethical reputation); Jan Bebbington et al., CorporateSocial
Reporting and Reputation Risk Management, 21 AccT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 337,

339-41 (2008) (proposing that CSR reporting is an essential part to a company's reputation risk
management, a practice necessary for strategic purposes).
130. loanna Foka, The FSM A Holistic Approach to Measuring Ethical and Social
Performance, 12 Bus. ETHICs: EUROPEAN REv. 314, 315 (2003).
13 1. Id.
132.

SUBHABRATA BOBBY BANERJEE, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE GOOD, THE

BAD AND THE UGLY 146 (Edward Elgar Publ'g Ltd. 2007).

133.

Id.
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KLD, van Oosterhout and Heugens 134 argue that the CSR evaluations
are in fact subjective and based on certain sweeping assumptions such
as negative filtering.13 5 Certain industries, such as tobacco, alcohol, and
gambling are given low CSR evaluations primarily because of the
nature of the business, rather than an in-depth analysis of the companies
as such.13 6 Further, many of these evaluation agencies present an
aggregate score or ranking in order to facilitate ease of use, particularly
by socially responsible investors.13 7
Where an evaluation is based on aggregate data, van Oosterhout and
Heugens ask how an aggregation can be meaningfully made of diverse
issues such as gender equality and waste management, or trade union
relations, and community pro bono involvement.' 38 The authors are of
the view that aggregate evaluations, which are leading the way in
convergent developments in measuring CSR performance, are not likely
to provide useful information as the aggregate masks the levels of issuespecific information which mar perhaps be more informative to
Aggregated evaluations may be
recipients if treated separately.
criticized for having opaque processes of selection and weighting, and
may be over or under-inclusive, and may fail to be quantitatively or
qualitatively meaningful. 140 Research by Chatterji et al. point out that
KLD, for example, systematically underweighs information of related
companies in the same group, and overweighs corporate information
that is predictive in nature, and hence the evaluation of CSR
performance may be more optimistic than warranted. 14 1 Further, van
Oosterhout and Heugens also point out that CSR performance evaluated
in academic writing tends to be based on different selections of
indicators and criteria, and hence any aggregate evaluation depends
highly on the selection of indicators made in the first place.14 2
CSR performance may also be based on opinion surveys, such as the
Fortune 500 rankings, which rank companies according to an aggregate
of concerns from stakeholder engagement to financial performance. 143
134. Van Oosterhout & Heugens, supra note 127, at 20-22.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 19.
137. Id. at 20.
138. Id
139. Id.
140. Risako Morimoto et al., Corporate Social Responsibility Audit: From Theory to
Practice,62 J. Bus. ETHICs 315, 319 (2005).
141. Aaron K. Chatterji et al., How Well Do Social Ratings Actually Measure Corporate
Social Responsibility?, 18 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 125, 132-62 (2009).

142. Van Oosterhout & Heugens, supra note 127, at 18.
143. See Fortune 500, 2010: Annual Ranking of America's Largest Corporations from
Fortune Magazine, at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2010/index.html
(listing the Fortune 500 rankings in 2010 and the key factors for arriving at the rankings).
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Some rankings are by and large based on a company's CSR report and
the evaluations issued by external agencies. For example, from 2005,
Fortune has started to rank the CSR performance of companies with the
assistance of opinion surveys and data collection undertaken by
AccountAbility.'" Other ranking agencies may undertake their own
research in addition to issuing questionnaires to corporations whose
provision of information may be based on what is in the CSR report.14 5
For example, in the United Kingdom, the "Sunday Times 100 Best
Companies to Work For" ranks companies according to the results of an
employee survey and organizational questionnaire. Ethisphere, a nonprofit organization with representation from business, academia, and
government also ranks companies by their ethical profiles, using the
results of organizational questionnaires and the analyses of data on
companies available publicly.14 6 Opinion surveys convey an easily
understandable and comparable format for CSR performance to be
popularly discerned, but it is ultimately based on information that
corporations put out, and like aggregate scores in ratings, it provides a
bite-size journalistic piece of information that is largely based on the
corporation's CSR report and may not provide any insight into peculiar
issues the corporation may face.
Standardization and convergence in CSR reporting may facilitate an
impression of comparability, greater credibility, and greater ease of use
in aggregate performance ratings and rankings, which are derived from
CSR reports, without actually addressing the issues of the diversity in
CSR performance and the quality of CSR reports. That said, the ratings
industry is very diverse, with fifty-eight leading companies issuing
ratings based on diverse methodologies. 147 However, research shows
that leaders in rating services such as KLD are able to influence longterm stakeholder attitudes and decisions.148 Standardization and
convergence in CSR reporting may be further reinforced by the rise of
assurance services for CSR reports.

144. See Social Responsibility: Most 'Accountable' Companies 2007: Full List,
CNNMoney.com, at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2007/accountability/
full list.html.
145. E.g., Sunday Times 100 Best Companies to Work For, TIMES ONLINE, at
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tolbusiness/career_andjobs/bestl00_companies/best 100-t
ables/; ETHISPHERE INSTITUTE, infra note 146.
146.

ETHISPHERE INSTITUTE, 2009 WORLD'S MOST ETHICAL COMPANIES, http://ethisphere.

com/wme2009/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
147. Bertelsmann Foundation, supra note 46, at 91.
148. Id.
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D. The Rise of Assurance Servicesfor CSR
Reporting and the Ramifications
Assurance services may be offered by independent third parties,
usually with technocratic expertise, to assure the credibility of
information that is put out by corporations. Information asymmetry
between the corporation (essentially management) and others is at the
root for the demand for assurance services, which provide a form of
market-based governance for business relations. Assurance services, as
well as certification services such as the ISO standards (except the
IS026000 social responsibility guidelines), have become a
contemporary form of governance, mitigating the information
asymmetry between corporations and others, and reducing transaction
costs. 149

A well-recognized form of assurance is the financial audit of
companies, or public sector bodies, as documented in Power's
provocative book. 50 The audit has been developed over the twentieth
century as a staple form of assurance for the financial reporting of
companies.'51 The importance of the audit has been established through
the leadership of the accounting profession, navigating the influences
and pressures from policymakers and regulators, and the self-regulating
preferences of business managers for internal controls and risk
management.152 The auditing profession has developed not only a
professional service, but professional education and trade bodies to
support the perceived quality, reputation, and exclusivity of the audit
service. 153 Over the years, remarkable convergence has taken place in
financial reporting standards across the world, and there remain two
dominant sets of standards in the GAAP and IFRS.154
149. See Margaret Blair et al., The Roles of Standardization,Certification,and Assurance
Services in Global Commerce (2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1 120503.
150.

1999).
151.
152.

MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION 28 (Oxford U. Press

Id.at23.
Id.

153. See KEES CAMFFERMAN & STEPHEN A. ZEFF, FINANCIAL REPORTING AND GLOBAL
CAPITAL MARKETS: A HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE,

1973-2000, at 105 (Oxford U. Press 2007) (charting the historical development of accounting
standards under the IASB, formally the IASC); BRIAN A. RUTHERFORD, FINANCIAL REPORTING
IN THE UK: A HISTORY OF THE ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE, 1969-1990, at 22

(Routledge 2007) (dealing with the political and professional struggles in the development of
accounting standards in the United Kingdom); Aila Virtanen, Revealing FinancialAccounting in
Finland Under Five Historical Themes, 14 ACCT. HIST. 357, 366 (2009) (discussing the
domination of regulatory, political, and professional influence in the development of accounting
standards first for internal bookkeeping use and then mainly for financial reporting).
154. Although some contend that there is no material difference between the IFRS and
U.S. GAAP and that the United States is increasingly moving toward accepting the
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In comparison to the standardization of financial reporting standards,
the standardization of CSR performance standards has been more
checkered. However, the rise of assurance services for CSR reporting
may be a way in for the accounting profession, in particular to take
leadership on reinforcing the standardization of CSR reporting and
perception management of CSR performance.
The two dominant assurance standards for social responsibility are
found in the second edition of AA1000AS issued by AccountAbility,
and the ISAE3000 issued by the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB). The AA1000AS is intended to be used by assurance
practitioners who may be able to provide assurance that companies have
adhered to the AA1000 Principles of Accountability (AAl000
Principles). 55 The scope of assurance may extend to other sustainability
matters outside of the AA1000 Principles, as may be agreed upon by the
company and assurance provider. ' 6 The assurance provider may
provide a high or limited level of assurance depending on the sources of
information verified, and the depth of evidence.'s The ISAE3000 is
issued to professional accountants who may be involved in CSR
assurance.
However, it is less specific than AA1000AS as it relates to
how a professional accountant should accept and conduct an assurance
engagement, such as the use of experts and evidence collection,
evaluation of the reasonableness and consistency of the company's CSR
disclosures, identifying the criteria for evaluating the specific subject
practitioner's
the
assurance
delineating
evaluated,
matter
responsibilities, and preparing a report and drawing conclusions. 59 The
assurance may be on a reasonable, limited, or no-assurance basis, a
reasonable assurance meaning that the professional accountant is able to
verify that CSR disclosures are fairly stated, a limited assurance
meaning that the professional accountant does not positively verify the
fair reporting of the CSR disclosure, but states that there is nothing that
may cause him to believe that the CSR reporting is unfair. oA
professional accountant is able to draw qualified, adverse, or
disclaimers of conclusion if the CSR disclosures by the company may
be misstated or misleading. 16 1
The AA1000AS supports the AA1000 Principles, and presents a
internationalization of the IFRS as non-U.S. companies listed in the United States need only file
financial reports in compliance with the IFRS. See L. Murphy Smith et al., Going International:
Accounting andAuditing Standards, 23 INTERNAL AuDITING 3, 6-11 (2008).
155. AccountAbility, supra note 38, at 8.
156. Id. at 6.
157. Id. at 11.
158. INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 55, 1 1.
159. Id. % 26-49.
160. Id. $ 49(j).
161. Id. %51-53.
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package for both companies and the assurance industry to use. The
market leader in standardized reporting is the GRI, and it could be
envisaged that assurance standards such as the ISAE3000 that does not
attach its assurance standard to any particular reporting standard, may
be able to accommodate the verification of GRI template disclosure.
Where there may be a combination of a market leader in the CSR
reporting template and persistent use of assurance in relation to that
template, even a neutral assurance standard such as the ISAE3000 may
become important in boosting the market leader in convergence.
Empirical research points out an interesting phenomenon of
assurance that is highly demanded in jurisdictions where stakeholder
groups are more recognized or influential, and where shareholder
litigation as a form of discipline is relatively weak.162 Hence, in these
jurisdictions, assurance is the key to the market-based governance in
respect of the CSR profiles of companies. 163 There is still little evidence
as to whether the extent of assurance affects stakeholders' perceptions
(i.e., whether stakeholders will perceive a limited assurance differently
from a reasonable assurance).
Empirical research is clearly needed in this area in order to
understand to what extent assurance, is perceived to act or actually acts
as a form of governance over the CSR profiles of companies. In relation
to the financial audit, Power' 64 has pointed out how the financial audit is
accepted as a form of governance that engenders external trust for
corporate disclosure and comfort for stakeholders, although it may not
produce substantive effects such as fraud prevention or prevention of
financial collapses and loss.' 65 Where assurance for CSR reporting is
concerned, the potential effects of assurance may be more disturbing.
One, the assurance still says nothing about CSR performance as
such, and is a much weaker form of assurance than the financial audit,
which in a way vouches for the way corporate financial performance
has been presented by the company. The two dominant assurance
standards mentioned above only go toward assuring if the CSR
reporting is based on information that the assurer could verify. If such
information relates to the existence of certain CSR processes and
162. Ans Kolk & Paolo Perego, Determinants of the Adoption of SustainabilityAssurance
Statements: An InternationalInvestigation, 19 Bus. STRATEGY & ENv'T 182 (2010); David N.
Herda & Martin E. Taylor, A Worldwide Comparison of Assurance on Corporate Social
Responsibility Reports: Are Audit Firms Willing to Sustain This Line of Service? (American
Accounting Association, Paper Presented at 2010 International Accounting Section Mid-Year
Conference Jan. 29, 2010).
163. See Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social
Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND THE LAW 207-37 (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., Cambridge U. Press, 2007).

164.
165.

POWER, supra note 150, at 98.
See id.
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systems, an assurer could verify that they exist and hence a corporation
reporting that they exist may gain assurance for so reporting.
Such assurance does not ensure that the proxy indicators for CSR
performance contained in the corporate reporting are relevant or
indicative of social cost or benefit. Next, if assurance is attached to an
increasingly standardized form of CSR reporting, the assurance creates
a perception of reinforcing the legitimacy and popularity of the
standardized template as indicative of CSR performance. Thirdly, the
assurance may in time perform a function of ritualistic comfort for the
concerned stakeholders, like how the financial audit has become, as
argued in Power's book.166
In relation to the convergence of financial reporting standards,
Sunder opines that:
Uniformity discourages research and debate in academic and
practice forums, and promotes increasingly detailed rule-making.
It shuts the door on learning through experimentation, making it
difficult to discover better ways of financial reporting through
practice and comparison of alternatives. Better financial reporting
calls for a careful balance between written standards and
-167
unwritten social norms.
Standardization and convergence in reporting, reinforced by
assurance, may entail an acceptance of impressionistic perceptions of
CSR reporting and performance that would primarily be useful to the
business case. Such a perception could in time weaken market-based
governance that could become complacent, uncritical, and
unchallenging.
Further, if stakeholders look to the assurance as a form of
governance for CSR, it is important for further research to be carried out
on the governance effects of assurance, and whether qualified and
limited assurances may provide disciplining effects on corporations.
One should note Power's concern with the perception of the role of
financial audit-as a ritualistic comfort, despite being substantively
rather hollow. O'Dwyerl 6 8 also suggests that assurances given for a
company's CSR statements may go no more than affirming that a
company is posturing toward becoming more responsible. 9 Such
166. Id.
167. Shyam Sunder, Adverse Effects of Uniform Written Reporting Standards on
Accounting Practice,Education, and Research, 29 J.ACCT. PUB. POL'Y 99, 100 (2010).
168. Brendan O'Dwyer, Theoretical and PracticalContributionsof Social Accounting to
Corporate Social Responsibility, in 1 CoRPoRATE SociAL RESPONSIBtITY, supra note 109,
at 219.
169. Id. at 220-21.
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assurances would relate more to corporate social "responsiveness"
rather than responsibility as such.
E. Standardizationand the Hegemony of Certain Values
Standardized templates for CSR reporting are arguably framed along
a consciousness of CSR that is very much based on the social
consciousness of the western developed economies. Sulkowski et al.
argue that what may be socially important to eastern emerging
economies, such as communitarian values and close relationships with
the government, are not regarded as important in the western notion of
CSR.170 Further, the dominance of CSR indicators based on the western
conception of social good and responsibility risks decontextualizing the
community and social concerns in local conditions, particularly in
developing economies. Schwartz and Tilling argue that standardization
removes from context specific local issues that need attention, and
compels corporations to engage in a one-size-fits-all implementation of
generic CSR.171 This often results in disproportionate costs being
imposed on the supply chain and a series of cosmetic "compliance"
measures that are taken without true engagement with the social impact
of the corporation.172 The conception of CSR performance that is drawn
out of standardized reporting may actually undermine the richness of
diverse and peculiar CSR issues that each corporation may need to

address.' 73
In sum, this Article argues that convergence or standardization in
CSR reporting may entail the following unintended consequences:
Standardization in the subject matter for reporting is based on
inclusiveness of all stakeholder concerns, but such standardization is
thin and allows corporations to engage in a manner of reporting that is
chiefly strategic in nature;
Market-based governance may, however, be content with such CSR
reports, and where supported by ratings providers, journalistic
opinions/polls, market-based governance on the demand side for CSR
reports is likely to be insufficiently critical.1 74 Questions remain in
whether there is continuous and critical process in corporations and
170. Sulkowski et al., supra note 89, at 796-97.
171. Birgitta Schwartz & Karina Tilling, 'ISO-lating' CorporateSocial Responsibility in
the OrganizationalContext: A Dissenting Interpretationof ISO 26000, 16 CORP. Soc. REsP. &
ENVTL. MGMT. 289,291 (2009).
172. Id. at 294; see also Ralph Hamann et al., Universalizing Corporate Social
Responsibility? South African Challenges to the International Organization for
Standardization's New Social Responsibility Standard, 110 Bus. & Soc'Y REv. 1 (2005)
(discussing the failure of standardized CSR to address specific issues in South Africa).
173. Schwartz & Tilling, supra note 171, at 297.
174. See id
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stakeholders meta-evaluating CSR indicators and their proxy values; 7 5
It remains uncertain if assurance may provide a form of governance
and discipline for CSR reporting or reinforce standardized CSR
reporting frameworks and provide ritualistic comfort to stakeholders.' 76
All these unintended consequences may entail from the
standardization and convergence movement, a path albeit paved with
good intentions. Back to the fundamentals, what stakeholders are
interested in knowing, is the individual CSR profile of a corporation and
the social benefits and cost of its activities. Hence, Part IV will embark
on introducing some thoughts in order to diminish the imperceptibility
of a corporation's individual CSR profile or the marginalization of the
needs of small or minority groups of stakeholders. This Article will
advocate an approach that emphasizes the need for the
"individualization" of a corporation's CSR profile as a countervailing
challenge against the increasing standardization in reporting and the
consequences it may entail. The "individualization" of a corporation's
CSR profile would involve the "critical engagement" of stakeholders of
individual companies. This approach will arguably maintain the
individual character of each company's CSR, without damaging any
benefits in comparability that may have already been achieved in the
movements toward standardization. To this end, the Article will draw
on critical management perspectives in stakeholder theory to argue that
companies need to include as part of their CSR reporting, a report on
engagement with stakeholders on issues of social benefit and cost, as
seen from the stakeholders' critical perspectives. It is hoped that such a
report would be able to capture the peculiar CSR concerns of each
individual company as affecting stakeholders. This also seems to be the
empirically reported demand from certain user groups in the recent GRI
survey.

IV. THE "CRITICAL STAKEHOLDERS"

REPORT

Company CSR reports are often criticized for being selective in
terms of the stakeholders with whom they have engaged. 7 8 Corporate
recognition of selected stakeholders' interests tends to be strategic in
nature, and Noland and Philips argue this phenomenon is unavoidable,
as corporations are inherently unable to have a Habermasian type of
moral discourse with stakeholders without the incursion of strategic
175.

Tomas B. Ramosa & Sandra Caeiro, Meta-performance Evaluation of Sustainability

Indicators, 10 ECOLOGICAL INDICATORS 157, 157 (2010).

176. See Schwartz & Tilling, supra note 171.
177. KPMG & ACCOUNTABILTY, COUNT ME IN,supra note 108, at 2.
178. See O'Connor & Spangenberg, supra note 79.
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interests and concerns.17 9 However, the critical management studies
movement would argue that the selection of which stakeholders are to
be regarded as deserving of engagement could be based on cnuestionable
and flawed perceptions as to the actual purpose(s) of CSR.1 o Although
this Article is not written in the tradition of the critical management
studies movement, it does question and challenge the benefits of the
standardization trend. This part will argue that, in order to preserve the
dynamic in the evolution of the conceptualization of what really
amounts to CSR performance, and perhaps CSR in general, there needs
to be attention given to encouraging the individualization of a
corporation's CSR profile and the peculiar challenges it faces, amidst
the standardization movement in CSR reporting. In particular, this part
will argue that perhaps companies should append to their CSR reports
an individual "critical stakeholders" report that discusses who the
company regards as stakeholders under the conditions of
"denaturalization" and "anti-performativity," and what issues of social
benefits and costs have been raised by these stakeholders. The critical
stakeholders report should also explain whether the company ranks the
importance of different stakeholders differently and why. The critical
stakeholders report would be unique to each company and the
identification of stakeholders could change and reflect the dynamism in
the conduct of corporate activities.
At this juncture, it is perhaps apt to distinguish the suggested
"critical stakeholders report" from CSR reporting based on the AA1000
principles of accountability' 8 ' which emphasize stakeholder
engagement in material issues. 82 The AA1000 principles are based on
the principles of inclusivity, materiality and responsiveness.18 3
Corporations adopting the AA1000 principles should thus have
processes and systems that ensure ongoing stakeholder engagement on
an inclusive basis, but based on material issues.1 84 The determination of
what is material would depend on the outworking of the processes and

179.

See James Noland & Robert Philips, Stakeholder Engagement, Discourse Ethics and

Strategic Management, 12 INT'L J. MGMT. REVIEws 39 (2010).

180.
has

been

Critical management studies as an alternative way of looking at management studies
championed since

1992. MATS

ALVESSON

& HUGH WILLMOTT,

CRITICAL

MANAGEMENT STUDIES (Sage 1992); see also Mats Alvesson et al., Introduction, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRITICAL MANAGEMENT STUDIES 1 (Mats Alvesson et al. eds., Oxford U.
Press 2009) (describing the nature of critical management studies as being challenging of
mainstream right-wing views or views that are instrumental/performative in nature).
181. See AA1000 Accountability Principles Standard 2008, http://www.accountability21.
net/uploadedFiles/publications/AAl O0OAPS%202008.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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systems corporations establish for that purpose.' 85 The corporation
should also have processes to respond and explain to stakeholders.186
The "critical stakeholders report" suggested here would also require
corporations to engage with stakeholders, but corporations are required
to identify the stakeholders under the conditions of denaturalization and
anti-performativity, and hence the strategic conception of CSR which is
mainstream is disapplied.18 7 Further, the element of "materiality" in the
AAl000 principles, which relate to strategic concerns, would also not
be applied so that corporations may consider marginalized, minority, or
alternative views that are of concern to stakeholders.' 8 8
The "denaturalization" approach refers to an approach that does not
accept as necessarily correct mainstream views or established positions,
such as shareholder primacy as the primary corporate goal.189 It seeks to
question what may be the alternatives to the mainstream perceptions.190
The "anti-performativity" approach does not accept the pursuit of any
knowledge as a means to an end, in particular, the end of
"maximization" of say, efficiency. Fournier and Grey describe "antiperformativity" as "[Critical Management Studies] questions the
alignment between knowledge, truth and efficiency ... and is concerned
with performativity only in that it seeks to uncover what is being done
in its name."' 9 1
It is suggested that in identifying the "critical stakeholders" for the
purposes of the recommended stakeholders report, companies should
refrain from identifying as stakeholders only those that necessarily are
affected by or influence the business case. This is because concerns that
are relevant to these groups are already largely reflected in the
increasingly standardized templates for reporting. Instead, companies
should arguably be challenged to explore its weaknesses in other
stakeholder concerns that may not necessarily affect the business case.
The examples raised by Banerjee are indigenous rights to resources,
community rights against displacement, and the preservation of
culture.192 The process of engaging with and documenting CSR
concerns from a denaturalized and anti-performative perspective may
allow companies to self-reflect upon alternative views and nonmajoritarian concerns that may still be valid causes of concern where
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Valerie Fournier & Chris Grey, At the CriticalMoment: Conditionsand Prospectsfor
CriticalManagement Studies, 53 HuM. REL. 7, 18 (2000).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 17.
192.

BANERJEE, supra note 132, at 149.
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social benefit and cost are involved. This individualized report should
also not become aggregated into a composite social performance score
or evaluation in order to preserve its individual character for the
purposes of discourse, engagement, and reflection.193
Reed' 94 suggests that stakeholders could be looked at from
alternative perspectives by identifying alternative "stakes" a constituent
may have which is not economic in nature. 195 Such stakes may be based
on the need for political equality in the development of laws, norms, or
governance, the need for fair economic opportunities to secure material
and non-material pursuits (and looking at the role of the corporation in
affecting that), and the need for authenticity in calling a corporation to
reflect upon and account for its role as a social citizen within the fabric
of the community of certain shared values, ethics, and norms. These
examinations would allow us to recognize stakeholders with alternative
"stakes" and the concerns that arise from these stakes in relation to
corporate activities, thereby providing a framework for identifying the
scope of "normative corporate responsibility."' 96 Such alternative
"stakes" fit in well with the denaturalized and anti-performative
parameters of the suggested "critical stakeholders report." Hence, the
suggested "critical stakeholders report" is able to draw from existing
academic literature in identifying the groups of stakeholders and the
type of concerns that corporations should give attention to in order to
prepare an individualized discussion of what "alternative" stakeholders
think. This is not to say that corporations need to act on all feedback
provided by alternative stakeholders, but the engagement process should
provide alternative spaces for reflection.1 97 It is also suggested that
corporations discuss in this report their reflections or proposed courses
of action or discourse following engagement with these stakeholders.
Further, Gao and Sirgyl98 suggest that companies should identify

193.

See Virginie Xhauflair & Marc Zune, Managing CorporateSocial Responsibility in

Complex Environments: Stakeholder Theory in Action, in 2 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY,

supra note 109, at 119 (indicating that a generic approach to stakeholders requires mediating
between stakeholder interests without giving cognizance to which interests are more "critical,"
the use of this is the ordinary meaning and not in the meaning of critical management studies.
An individualized stakeholder identification and engagement approach may be more relevant to
the company's unique interests).
194. See Darryl Reed, Stakeholder Management Theory: A Critical Theory Perspective, 9
Bus. ETHICS Q. 453, 453-83 (1999).
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. For a critical opinion, see Conley & Williams, supra note 16.
198. Tao Gao & M. Josepg Sirgy, Revisiting Sirgy's CorporatePerformanceMeasurement
Model: Towards A Management Audit that Captures Corporate Social Responsibility and
Beyond, in 2 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 109, at 154.
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their unique sets of internal, external, and distal stakeholders.' 99 Internal
stakeholders generally refer to employees in various departments in the
corporate bureaucracy; external stakeholders generally refer to outsiders
with contractual relations with the company; and distal stakeholders
may be outsiders without such a contractual connection, but are
nevertheless influential upon and interested in the company's activities
and reputation. 20 0 They also suggest that CSR performance should also
evaluate the quality of stakeholder relationships in these three groups,
based on how far stakeholder trust, commitment, and satisfaction are
achieved. 20 1 This alternative perspective sees the quality of stakeholder
relationships as important per se, and not necessarily as instrumental to
any other ends.20 2
Would this critical approach of engaging stakeholders enmesh the
corporation into procedural rituals, seeking discourse only to appear
responsible? Or would, as Hunt suggests critically, maneuvers in CSR
so dominate corporate activity that business would lose its focus and its
way? 2 0 3 However, a purely liberal and private view of the corporation is
increasingly difficult to sustain,204 especially where multinational
corporations may wield great economic, social, and political power,2 0 5
and the activities and impact of a corporation often extend well beyond
206
The proposed suggestion to create a
its contractual parameters.
199. Id. at 153-54.
200. Id. at 154.
201. Id. at 157-58.
202. See Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the
Corporation:Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 65 (1995) (arguing
that the corporation could see stakeholder engagement or accountability as descriptive, being
reflective of practice, instrumental, being key to achieving economic ends, or normative, being
important and valued as such).
203. See BENJAMIN HUNT, THE TIMID CORPORATION: WHY BUSINESS IS TERRIFIED OF
TAKING RISK (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 2003).
204.

See generally J.E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN

THE THEORY OF COMPANY LAW (Oxford U. Press 1993).
205. Eric Kolodner, Transnational Corporations: Impediments of Catalysts of Social
Development? (World Summit for Soc. Dev., Occasional Paper No. 5, 1994). Multinational
corporations may be powerful in corporate relations with host governments, and in corruption.
See Peter Rodriguez et al., Three Lenses on the MultinationalEnterprise: Politics, Corruption
and Corporate Social Responsibility, 37 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 733, 733-46 (2006). But the
multinational corporation as one coherent institution on its own is not an accurate depiction. The
multinational business of today spans a number of different corporate personalities and includes
outsourcing, investments, joint ventures in many different jurisdictions, and hence what is the
corporation and where it is a "rootless cosmopolitan," and hence where are the boundaries of its
social responsibility? See Gerald F. Davis et al., The Responsibility Paradox: Multinational
Firms and Global Corporate Social Responsibility (U. of Mich. Ross Sch. of Bus. Working
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1031, 2006), available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/
bitstream/2027.42/41221/1l/103 1.pdf.
206.
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"critical stakeholders report" in order to provide a platform for
engagement of alternative stakeholder concerns that are denaturalized
and anti-performative in nature should be seen as a gentle extension into
the self-regulatory governance landscape of CSR issues that are
unregulated. The suggested "critical stakeholders report" is likely to
assist in enhancing the quality of self-regulatory governance, or
otherwise the persistence of thin market-based governance may
eventually be seen as a market failure warranting more intrusive forms
of regulation, which may not always be intelligent and appropriate.
The recent GRI survey2 07 also documents many stakeholders'
opinion that CSR reports still need to improve in explaining how and
why stakeholder engagement with selected groups takes place, and the
treatment of stakeholders' feedback and critical views. 20 This reflects
practical concerns surrounding the need for better corporate engagement
with stakeholders, which underlines a general concern for the
corporation's individualized reflection upon, recognition of, and
response to its unique set of stakeholders and their responsibility
concerns. Returning to stakeholder engagement and views is arguably
the key approach to challenging the increasingly corporate-centric form
of CSR reporting and evaluation that dominates perception, and is
supported by a thin form of standardization in reporting frameworks.
This Article argues for preserving the capacity and demonstration of
individualized corporate reflection, recognition, and response, so that
the corporation may be able to demonstrate legitimate and credible selfgovernance,209 addressing its unique responsibility concerns through
discourse and action. This Article is particularly concerned that the
gradual convergence or standardization in CSR reporting may not
eclipse the importance of individualized corporate responsibility or
allow CSR performance to descend into a form of perception
management without addressing the yet dynamic and multifaceted
developments in conceptualizing what constitutes CSR performance.
Hence, CSR reporting should attempt to capture the peculiar and
individual aspects of corporate responsibility unique to each corporation
based on its stakeholder profiles, especially within a denaturalized and
anti-performative approach that will provide an account of the CSR
management by the corporation beyond standardized reporting. This is
essential in order to support the credibility or legitimacy of the

POWER (Free Press 2005); see also LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY:
AMERICA'S NEWEST EXPORT (Yale University Press 2001); see also Benedict Sheehy,

Corporationsand Social Costs: The Wal-Mart Case Study, 24 J.L. & CoM. 1 (2004).
207.
208.
209.
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Id.
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voluntary and self-governing nature of CSR, which many, to date, 2 10
have pointed out is under threat for being unenforceable, cosmetic, and
too corporate-centric.
V. CONCLUSION

This Article observes that CSR reporting has developed rapidly, and
the contemporary trend is that of standardization and convergence in
reporting standards. Although users generally perceive this as
establishing credibility and comparability for CSR reports, and hence
the legitimacy of the private nature of self-regulatory and stakeholder
governance in CSR in general, this Article suggests that standardization
may result in certain unintended consequences that may undermine
market-based governance in CSR issues that are unregulated. The
Article has argued that the standardization is in fact rather thinly based
and does not affect the corporate capacity to use the CSR report as a
form of strategic business communication that may not provide much
insight into CSR performance. However, if reinforced by the rise of
assurance and ratings derived from CSR reports, CSR reports may still
be regarded as credible information on CSR performance, allowing
CSR performance to be determined impressionistically rather than
rigorously. This would bring to question the reality of market-based
governance on the demand side of the CSR reports. The Article delves,
at length, into critically challenging such market-based governance and
seeks to find a way so as to enhance market-based governance instead
of calling for its substitution or diminution by regulation. The Article
argues that this may be achieved by asking that corporations append to
their CSR reports a critical stakeholders report that adopts a
denaturalized and anti-performative approach to identifying and
reflecting upon affected stakeholders and their non-business concerns.
Perhaps this move to re-individualize a corporation's CSR profile may
be necessary to countervail some of the unintended consequences from
standardization and convergence in CSR reporting that may undermine
the conception of CSR performance itself and the market-based
governance surrounding that conception. Even if the arguments in this
piece may not particularly appeal to corporations, it is arguable that
210. See Joseph Corkin, Misappropriating Citizenship: The Limits of Corporate Social
Responsibility, in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CORPORATIONS,
GLOBALISATION AND THE LAw 39-60 (Nina Boeger et al. eds., Edward Elgar Publ'g 2008)
[hereinafter PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY]; see Charlotte Villiers,
Corporate Law, Corporate Power and Corporate Social Responsibility, in PERSPECTIVES ON
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 85-108. See also BANERJEE, supranote 132.
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taking such steps to re-individualize a part of CSR reporting and reflect
on non-business stakeholder issues may be key to preserving credible
legitimacy of the voluntary and self-governing nature of CSR in the
wider landscape of public-private governance of enterprise.
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